Retrieval Enhances Eyewitness Suggestibility to Misinformation in Free and Cued Recall
Misinformation is detrimental to the accuracy of eyewitness memory reports (Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus, 1975 ; for a review, see Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2013) . Because eyewitness testimony serves a crucial role in the legal system, discovering techniques that could reduce eyewitness suggestibility to misinformation is highly desirable. One potential technique is retrieval practice. The testing effect, which refers to enhanced retention due to retrieval practice (for a recent review, see Roediger, Putman, & Smith, 2011) , has generated considerable research interest. If retrieval practice enhances memory of a witnessed event, then this enhancement would seem likely to reduce misinformation suggestibility. However, contrary to this possibility, retrieval practice can sometimes increase the negative influence of misleading suggestions on eyewitness memory performance -a finding termed retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES, Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009 ). Due to the frequency that witnesses engage in repeated retrieval, it is prudent to examine the conditions under which recalling details of a witnessed event might, or might not, produce RES.
Although the RES effect has been reported in various procedures (e.g., Chan & Langley, 2011; Chan & LaPaglia, 2011; , several important aspects of its generality remain unclear.
Specifically, all studies demonstrating RES possess two characteristics. First, the initial test was administered in a cued recall format, with questions querying specific details of the witnessed event. Second, event details contradicted by misinformation were mostly peripheral in nature (e.g., the type of car driven by a person, the color of the shirt worn by a person). The present research investigates whether initial retrieval increases suggestibility only under these conditions by examining a) whether RES occurs when the initial test is free recall and b) whether the RES effect occurs for both central and peripheral event details.
Applied Implications of Retrieval-Enhanced Suggestibility
From an applied perspective, it is crucial to understand whether the RES effect generalizes to situations in which initial recall does not resemble a cued recall test. Instead of asking questions about specific details of the witnessed event, criminal investigations often begin when witnesses call 9-1-1 and are asked to "tell everything," which is far more similar to a free recall test than a cued recall test. Indeed, the free recall report provided by an eyewitness during the early stages of an investigation can dictate how an investigation proceeds (e.g., if a witness recalls that the perpetrator is a white male, this information would constrain the subsequent search to suspects with similar characteristics), including what follow-up questions are asked by the investigators during subsequent interviews (e.g., if a witness recalls that the perpetrator got away in a car, the investigator might ask what type of car, etc.). Beyond reports to 911 operators, free recall is also prominently featured in all of the major standardized investigative interview protocols, including the Stepwise Interview (Yuille, Hunter, Joffe, & Zaparniuk, 1993) , the Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) , the Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings Interview (formerly Memorandum of Good Practice, Home Office, 1992 Office, , 2001 , and the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) protocol (Lamb, 2007) . Consequently, free recall plays a major role in criminal investigations. Because RES has only been demonstrated with an initial cued recall test, little is known about whether free recall retrieval practice would increase subsequent eyewitness suggestibility or produce a testing benefit. Indeed, if the RES effect is limited to situations for which initial recall involves the presentation of specific questions, then this constraint must be taken into account when considering the applicability of RES to criminal investigations. On the other hand, observing RES following initial free recall would greatly increase its generality and potential applicability to criminal investigations.
Of additional importance to the generality and applicability of RES is the effect of item centrality. Memory for central details is typically less susceptible to misinformation than memory for peripheral details (Heath & Erickson, 1998; Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008 , but see also Dalton & Daneman, 2006 , who reported the opposite). In fact, some studies have demonstrated that memory for central details is not at all susceptible to the influence of misinformation (Loftus, 1979; Porter, Spencer, & Birt, 2003; Wright & Stroud, 1998) .
Currently, there is no general consensus on how best to define item centrality. Some researchers have defined central and peripheral information as details that are important and incidental to the thrust of the witnessed event, respectively (Dalton & Daneman, 2006; Loftus 1979; Wright & Stroud, 1998) . Others defined centrality based on the frequency that those details are reported in free recall, with more frequently recalled items classified as central and less frequently recalled items as peripheral (Heath & Erickson, 1998; Saunders, 2009) . We opted to define item centrality in the latter way because this definition is quantifiable and arguably more objective. If centrality had been defined by subjective norms applied by the experimenters or participants, it would be difficult to identify the precise criteria used to separate the central from the peripheral details. Further, subjective opinion regarding what is central versus peripheral to an event can vary greatly from one person to the next; this variation might have contributed to the disputed vulnerability of central details to misinformation-even among studies that adopted similar methods of experimenter-defined central and peripheral items (Dalton & Daneman, 2006; Wright & Stroud, 1998) . By our definition, central items are necessarily easier to remember than peripheral items, and would likely be more resistant to misinformation (Holliday, Douglas, & Hayes, 1999; Marche, 1999; Okado & Stark, 2005) . Therefore, we expect the central items to be accompanied by a much smaller misinformation effect than the peripheral items. The interesting unknown is whether initial testing would increase suggestibility for these central items.
Importantly, even if item centrality were found to affect the magnitude of RES (e.g., that only peripheral details are susceptible to RES), the phenomenon would not be rendered trivial for several reasons. First, event details that are less memorable or less central are not necessarily less important in the context of a criminal investigation. Crimes are often complex and what constitutes important information cannot be easily predicted. Indeed, the course of an investigation can often lead investigators to reassess the relative importance or unimportance of specific pieces of evidence. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, witnesses who incorporate peripheral details into their memory reports are perceived as more credible than those who omit such details (Bell & Loftus, 1988; 1989; Wells & Leippe, 1981) . Thus, examining potential moderators of RES (such as item centrality) could help to further illuminate its application in legal contexts.
Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Retrieval-Enhanced Suggestibility
Proposed theoretical mechanisms underlying RES are beginning to emerge.
1 One 1 One account suggests that memory for the original event must undergo reconsolidation after initial retrieval (Hardt, Einarsson, & Nader, 2010) , and presentation of the misinformation disrupts this reconsolidation process, thus impairing later retrieval of the original memory (Chan et al., 2009; Chan et al., 2012; . We do not dwell on the reconsolidation hypothesis in this paper because these experiments were not designed to address this possibility.
account ascribes RES to preferential encoding of the misinformation following initial testing (Chan et al., 2009; Thomas, Bulevich, & Chan, 2010) . For explication purposes, we refer to this notion as the attention allocation hypothesis (Chan, Wilford, & Hughes, 2012; Thomas et al., 2010) . The attention allocation account posits that the initial test questions serve as cues for the later presented misinformation. For example, if a participant is asked about the type of vehicle driven by the perpetrator, this question might draw attention to that detail later, causing participants to preferentially encode the relevant misinformation. Essentially, this is similar to the prequestions effect in the education literature, where providing students with a set of questions before they read an essay often facilitates learning of that essay. More specifically, the prequestions effect is characterized by enhanced recall of information specifically targeted by or related to the prequestions, whereas recall of information unrelated to the prequestions is diminished (Hamaker, 1986) . The occurrence of this effect has been attributed to increased attention paid to the materials queried by the prequestions at the expense of other materials (Lewis & Mensink, 2012) . When this experimental phenomenon is applied to the present context, RES can be explained by increased attention to the later misinformation because the initial test included questions related to the misinformation. To be clear, as is presently conceived, the attention allocation hypothesis suggests that RES is the direct result of asking witnesses specific questions during the initial test.
In the present experiments, we provide a test for an extension of the attention allocation account by administering the initial test in a free recall format. All previous demonstrations of RES have been limited to protocols with an initial cued recall test. It is therefore unclear how initial free recall would affect encoding of subsequent misinformation and whether RES would occur in this context. It is well known that free recall differs from cued recall on a number of dimensions, including a heavier reliance on recollection (Hamilton & Rajaram, 2003; Tulving, 1985) , self-generated retrieval cues (Burgess & Shallice, 1996) , and organization processes (Zaromb & Roediger, 2010) . Although a considerable amount of research has demonstrated that testing can potentiate subsequent learning (e.g., Arnold & McDermott, 2013; Izawa, 1970) , far less is known about the processes by which free recall affects subsequent learning of complex prose materials (Dunlosky, Rawson, & McDonald, 2009 ).
In the present experiments, misinformation was presented in an audio narrative that recapitulated much of the witnessed event. Prior free recall may lead to better organization and increased accessibility of details of the witnessed event, which may in turn facilitate comprehension and encoding of the postevent narrative (Arnold & McDermott, 2013; Wissman, Rawson, & Pyc, 2011) . It is also possible that by completing the initial free recall test, participants are better able to anticipate the level of details required to perform well on any subsequent memory tests, thus causing a shift in encoding strategy towards remembering details (Britton, Glynn, Muth, & Penland, 1985; McCrudden & Schraw, 2007 (Lachman & Laughery, 1968; Padilla-Walker & Poole, 2002; Thompson, Wenger, and Bartling, 1978) . When a relearning opportunity arises, the initial test allows participants to better allocate their attentional resources to the items that were not well learned (Battig, Allen, & Jensen, 1965; Son & Kornell, 2008) . Of particular relevance to the present study is whether prior free recall would have different effects on the central and peripheral misinformation. Because peripheral details are unlikely to be reported during the initial free recall test (and indeed this was how we operationally define peripheral items in the present study), the tested participants might be particularly "sensitive" to these details when they appear during the postevent narrative (by virtue of their noticing that these details were omitted from their free recall report earlier), thus leading to an RES effect for the peripheral details.
As this brief theoretical analysis demonstrates, there are reasons to believe that RES would occur following initial free recall. We caution, however, that this is not a foregone conclusion and the attention allocation hypothesis would have to be broadened substantially from its present form to account for a free recall-based RES effect.
Overview of the Present Experiments
In three experiments, we examined whether RES is sensitive to variations in test format and item centrality. In Experiment 1, in keeping with the typical RES procedure, both the initial and final tests were cued recall. This experiment served two purposes. First, we examined whether central and peripheral details are differentially susceptible to RES in the standard procedure. Second, because it is unclear whether RES would occur with a free recall initial test, it is important to first establish the effect with the present materials and participant population.
In Experiment 2, the initial test was administered in a free recall format. This change allowed us to examine whether an initial cued recall test is necessary to produce RES. In
Experiment 3, we further tested the generality of RES by using free recall for both the initial and final tests. This experiment serves two purposes. First, it provides an even more stringent test for the generality of RES. RES has been demonstrated across a variety of final test formats including cued recall (Chan et al., 2009) , forced choice recognition (Thomas et al., 2010) , and source discrimination (Chan et al., 2012) , but it has yet to be demonstrated in a free recall final test. More importantly, because free recall is based heavily, though certainly not entirely (McCabe, Roediger, & Karpicke, 2011; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012) , on recollection (Tulving, 1985) , demonstrating RES in a final free recall test would buttress previous claims that misinformation reported in this procedure is due to true source misattributions rather than guessing (Chan et al., 2012) .
Experiment 1 Method
Participants. Sixty undergraduate students (N = 30 for each testing condition) participated in this experiment for course research credit.
Design. We used a 2 (Test Condition: test, no-test) x 3 (Item Type: central, peripheral, or neutral) mixed-factorial design. Test condition was manipulated between-subjects whereas item type was manipulated within-subjects. Note that because all participants were administered a final test, the test and no-test labels refer only to the presence or absence of the initial test.
Materials and procedure.
We conducted a pilot study to determine item centrality.
Participants (N = 20) viewed the 8 min critical event video of a museum burglary. Afterwards, participants were given 20 min to type into a blank Word document, in as much detail as possible, the events they remembered from the video. Each narrative was coded into idea units for scoring. Idea units were considered to be the smallest component of words or phrases that conveyed a meaningful idea. For instance, any early mention of the burglar "zip-lining" or "sliding down a rope" would be considered one idea unit concerning how the burglar got to the roof of the museum. Six units recalled frequently were defined as central items (M = .74, SD = .23), and six units not recalled frequently were defined as peripheral items (M = .19, SD = .12).
An additional six units with a range of recall frequencies were designated as neutral (never misled) items (M = .34, SD = .26). The neutral items were included so that not all questions in the cued recall tests queried details that were contradicted by misinformation. These central, peripheral, and neutral items dealt with different video details and remained consistent across participants and experiments (refer to Appendix).
In Experiment All participants then listened to an audio narrative (~6 min) via headphones. Participants were told that the narrative recapped the burglary video, but they were not told anything specific regarding the veracity of the narrative (or that it included misinformation). Two versions of the narrative were constructed and counterbalanced across participants. The two narratives were identical with the exception of the twelve pieces of misinformation (e.g., Version A: the burglar used two identical black claws with 3-prongs to retrieve the diamond; Version B: the burglar used one silver mechanical 3-pronged arm to retrieve the diamond; Correct Answer: the burglar used two silver metal arms with 2 and 3-prongs to retrieve the diamond, refer to Appendix).
These different sets of misinformation were created to increase generalizability. The six neutral items were not mentioned in either version of the narrative (although they were presented in the video). After the audio narrative, all participants completed a final cued recall test that was identical to the initial test taken by participants in the test condition. Participants were specifically instructed to answer all questions based on what they remembered from the video.
Results and Discussion
We focused our data analyses on the central and peripheral misinformation items, but for the sake of completeness, data for the neutral items are also presented (refer to top of Table 1 ). Initial cued recall test. Initial test data will not be discussed in detail but are displayed at the top of Table 2 . Of most relevance to our purposes, spontaneous misinformation generation was extremely low for the central items (.01) and fairly low for the peripheral items (.11).
Spontaneous misinformation generation refers to the proportion of misinformation responses reported before the misinformation was introduced via the audio narrative (i.e., misinformation responses that were spontaneously reported without suggestions). We now report results from the final test.
Final cued recall test. Confidence data for the final test are reported in Table 1 (for neutral items) and incorrect responses, including "other intrusions," "no answer," and "spontaneous false recall."
More interestingly, the misinformation recall probability for these initially correct items was still numerically (though not significantly, M = .44) higher than that of the non-tested participants (M = .36), t(26) = .97, d = .38, p =.34. This result is particularly impressive given the inherent item selection differences built into such a comparison (i.e., the initially correct items for the tested participants necessarily reflected the easier and more memorable ones, whereas both easy and difficult items were included for the non-tested participants).
Testing did not affect the likelihood that one would report misinformation for the central items, t(58) = 1.41, d = .37, p = .17. In fact, recall probability of the central misinformation was close to floor, although the difference was in the direction of RES (M = .11 for test and M = .06
for no-test). Moreover, testing did not alter correct recall probability of central items (M = .54
for both test and no-test), t(58) = .091, d = .02, p = .93. Given the way we defined central misinformation (as items with high free recall probabilities), it is not too surprising that these items were more resistant to misinformation than the peripheral items. Moreover, unlike the peripheral items, participants' susceptibility to later central misinformation was not significantly affected by whether one correctly recalled the item (M = .14) or not (M = .07) during the initial test, t(25) = 1.48, d = .28, p = .15.
In sum, we generalized the RES effect to a new set of materials, though the effect appeared to be restricted to peripheral details. We provide a more thorough discussion regarding item centrality in the General Discussion.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we examined the influence of completing an initial free recall test on subsequent eyewitness suggestibility. As stated in the Introduction, free recall is a major component of several investigative interview techniques and 911 protocols, and yet, all extant demonstrations of RES occurred with a cued recall initial test. Therefore, administering the initial retrieval attempt in free recall provides an important test for the generality of RES.
Theoretically, according to the attention allocation hypothesis, initial testing exacerbates eyewitness suggestibility because it inadvertently enhances encoding of the later presented misinformation. Again, as is presently conceived, the attention allocation hypothesis makes no explicit predictions about whether initial free recall would lead to RES. However, a modified version of the hypothesis, which takes into account the literature on test-potentiated learning, can lead one to predict an RES effect following initial free recall.
Method
Participants. One hundred and twenty undergraduate students (N = 60 for each testing condition) participated in this experiment. Third, an additional distractor task was inserted between the audio narrative and final test. In this task, participants counted backwards by three starting at 500 for five min. The final test was still administered in a cued recall format and matched that in Experiment 1. Table 2 ). These data were similar to those from the pilot experiment. Further, an analysis of the mean number of critical items (i.e., the 18 items designated as central, peripheral, and neutral) recalled at each 5 min interval reveals that participants did utilize all 20 min in the free recall task (refer to top of Table 4 ). Spontaneous misinformation generation was rare for both central items (M = .02) and peripheral items (M = .04).
Results and Discussion

Final cued recall test.
A single coder coded responses in the recall test into one of four categories: correct, misinformation, other intrusions, or no answer (i.e., blank or "I don't know"). A different coder re-coded 25% of the final cued recall responses to verify the consistency of the coding-the coders matched at a proportion of .86. Once again, confidence ratings were not affected by initial testing and these data are presented in Table 1 (neutral items) and Table 3 (central and peripheral items).
Most important for present purposes is that taking an initial free recall test increased the report of misinformation in the final cued recall test (refer to Figure 2 In sum, we found that RES is preserved with an initial free recall test. These results show that a cued recall initial test is not necessary for RES to occur. We discuss the theoretical and applied implications of this finding following presentation of the results from Experiment 3. 2 We opted not to conduct a conditional analysis of final false recall probability based on initial recall accuracy for Experiments 2 and 3. There were too few initially incorrect central items (1.7 observations per participant in Experiment 2 and 0.9 items per participant in Experiment 3) and initially correct peripheral items (1.26 observations per participant in Experiments 2 and 3, see Table 2 ) to produce reliable, stable results for the comparison. Note that "incorrect" central items include those coded as "incorrect", "spontaneous misinformation", and omitted items.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we examined whether the RES effect generated by an initial free recall test would occur when the final test was also administered in a free recall format. This is important because details reported spontaneously (as in free recall) are often perceived to be more accurate than those reported following prompts (as in cued recall). For example, in the trainers' manual for law enforcement issued by the Department of Justice (2003), law enforcement officials are instructed specifically to encourage the witness to volunteer information without prompting, because "unprompted responses tend to be more accurate than those given in response to an interviewer's questioning" (p. 19). Consequently, if the RES effect occurs with a final free recall test, it would further bolster the idea that RES has important legal implications. Further, despite the vast literature on eyewitness suggestibility, a surprisingly small number of studies have examined the influence of misinformation on free recall performance. Of the few studies that used free recall as the final test, some have failed to demonstrate any discernable misinformation effect (Bjorklund, Bjorklund, Brown, & Cassel, 1998; Bjorklund, Cassell, Bjorklund, et al., 2000) . Therefore, whether initial testing can produce confidently held false memories for misinformation that persist in a free recall final test remains to be seen (cf., Roediger & McDermott, 1995 Table 2 ). The majority of participants again appeared to engage in the free recall task for the entire 20 min (see middle of Table 4 ). The frequency of spontaneous misinformation generation was again very low for central (M = .01) and peripheral items (M = .03). Overall, as expected, these data are similar to those in Experiment 2.
Final free recall test. Most importantly, the RES effect persisted for peripheral items even when both the initial and final tests were administered in a free recall format. Similar to previous reports, the free recall format is highly resistant to the influence of misinformation (Bjorklund et al., 1998 (Bjorklund et al., , 2000 , such that the non-tested participants recalled very little of the peripheral misinformation they encountered (M = .10). Remarkably, initial testing nearly doubled false recall probability for these items (M = .19), t(118) = 2.57, d = .47, p < .02 (refer to for no-test), t < 1, p = .64. When recall probability of the critical items were examined based on time (see bottom of Table 4 ), it is clear that some participants used the full 25 min for the free recall task, although performance appears to begin reaching asymptote during the 20 th and 25 th minute.
General Discussion
Three primary findings emerged from these experiments. First, initial retrieval exacerbated suggestibility regardless of whether the initial test format was cued recall (Experiment 1) or free recall (Experiments 2 and 3). Second, RES occurred regardless of whether the final test was cued recall (Experiments 1 and 2) or free recall (Experiment 3). Third, the magnitude of the RES effect was greater for peripheral details than for central details. These results extend the implications of RES to eyewitness suggestibility in legal contexts. Before discussing these implications, we first address whether central details are susceptible to the influence of RES.
Are Central Details Immune to Retrieval-Enhanced Suggestibility?
In all three experiments, no significant RES effect was found for the central details. In fact, it appears that the central details were generally immune to misinformation, as recall probabilities of the central misinformation were consistently near floor. Although one might be tempted to conclude that central items in a witnessed event represent a boundary for RES, a closer examination suggests a more complex story. In every experiment, initial testing increased, albeit not significantly, the recall probability of the central misinformation items ( However, given the difficulty in obtaining a sizable misinformation effect with central items (e.g., Heath & Erickson, 1998; Roebers & McConkey, 2003; Sutherland & Hayne, 2001) , it is quite impressive that initial testing nearly doubled the misinformation effect for these items. This finding suggests that central details of a witnessed event may not be immune to the influence of RES.
Applied Implications
Eyewitnesses are often asked to recount the details of their experience to authorities on multiple occasions (e.g., 911 operators, police officers, lawyers, jurors, etc.). Further, these recall attempts represent a small portion of the times a witness will inevitably recall or think about a witnessed event. Any event warranting an eyewitness account is likely of enough significance for most people to share with friends and family. These events are also likely to be mentally reviewed spontaneously by the eyewitness. Such informal retrieval attempts are of particular relevance to the present research because they conform more closely to free recall (rather than cued recall) protocols. Moreover, recent evidence has shown that people spontaneously recall past events far more often than was previously realized (Hintzman, 2011; Rasmussen & Bernsten, 2009 ). Thus, the extension of RES to situations employing either cued or free recall constitutes a crucial piece of evidence in the generality of the RES phenomenon and its potential implications for legal investigations. The present results might appear to contradict those showing that performing an initial Cognitive Interview can reduce subsequent eyewitness suggestibility (Gabbert, Hope, Fisher, & Jamieson, 2012; Memon, Zaragoza, Clifford, & Kidd, 2010) . We caution that significant methodological differences exist between these studies and ours, which makes direct comparisons difficult (e.g., Memon et al. asked participants to fabricate their own misinformation). Moreover, whether completing an initial From an applied perspective, perhaps the most important finding here was that RES occurred when both the initial and final tests were free recall. This finding is particularly notable for several reasons: First, most research on the misinformation effect has used either cued recall or recognition as the final test format. This methodological decision stems from the fact that researchers are interested in the effects of misinformation on a particular memory detail. Asking a question about that particular detail naturally provides the best way to assess the effect of misinformation on memory for that detail. This is similar to teachers asking specific questions on an exam, because they want to know if students learned the critical, or important, facts. The problem with this approach in the context of eyewitness memory is that cued recall cannot assess whether an eyewitness would report misinformation spontaneously (i.e., without direct cues to the misinformation-relevant detail). In legal settings, it is often impossible to know if a person
has encountered exactly what, if any, misinformation. Consequently, it is not possible to ask specific questions pertaining directly to any misinformation. If misinformation is not spontaneously reported without targeted prompts (as in, e.g., a free recall test), then its influence on memory might be more limited in real-world settings than is suggested by research in the laboratory. In Experiment 3, we showed that participants could be induced to report misinformation in a free recall test (at least for the peripheral details). Even more importantly, initial testing almost doubled the frequency of reported misinformation in free recall.
Theoretical Implications
The data from Experiments 2 and 3 show that completing an initial free recall test can increase people's susceptibility to later presented misinformation. From a theoretical perspective, these data can be accommodated by a modified, broader version of the attention allocation account as outlined in the Introduction, which posits that RES occurs because initial free recall enhances the learning of subsequent misinformation. Thus, it seems that initial testing, regardless of format, alters how people encode subsequent information (de Winstanley & Bjork, 2004; Izawa, 1970; Karpicke, 2009; Son & Kornell, 2008; Thompson, Wenger, & Bartling, 1978) .
Although the results are similar across experiments (i.e., they produced a RES effect of similar magnitudes), initial cued recall and free recall might have enhanced subsequent encoding of the misinformation based on different mechanisms. When participants were administered a cued recall initial test, their attention was drawn to the subsequent misinformation because the initial test questions foreshadowed the importance of these specific details. That is, to some extent, participants' allocation of attention was manipulated by the experimenter; just as prequestions can serve to direct students' attention to particularly important information (Hamaker, 1986) . In contrast, because no specific questions were asked in the free recall test, any facilitation of misinformation learning during the postevent narrative phase cannot be attributed to experimenter-induced attention to the misinformation. Instead, the free recall initial test likely provided participants with an opportunity to determine what information they could and could not recall (Padilla-Walker & Poole, 2002) . When participants listened to the misinformation narrative later, they might notice details that were omitted from (most likely for the peripheral misinformation), or were inconsistent with (likely for the central items), their initial free recall report and thus allocated more effort to encode these details.
Consistent with this notion, people typically spend more time to encode information that they missed on a previous test in multi-trial learning environments (Battig et al., 1965; Son & Kornell, 2008; and more broadly, Nelson, Dunlosky, Graf, & Narens, 1994; Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999) . Unlike these studies, where the learner has free control over study time, participants had no control over study time in the present study. Because the misinformation was presented via a fixed paced audio narrative, all participants received the same amount of time to process each piece of misinformation. As a result, the increased learning of misinformation in the present study must be attributed to more efficient encoding processes following testing (see also Karpicke, 2009 ). This notion is related to the theoretical account proposed by Arnold & McDermott (2013) , which posited that free recall potentiated subsequent learning due to enhanced organization of the already encoded information. By asking participants to freely recall learned material, they are better able to organize their memory of that learned material. This enhanced organization can lead to better processing of any new or unlearned information by increasing one's awareness that the information is new or unlearnedprioritizing cognitive resources to anything not incorporated into one's current memory.
Consequently, when a second study opportunity is presented (i.e., the audio narrative), the new (mis)information is prioritized and encoded more efficiently.
The enhanced encoding of misinformation could also be attributed to activation of related information during initial testing (Carpenter, 2011; Chan, McDermott, & Roediger, 2006; Grimaldi & Karpicke, 2012) . That is, during the initial recall phase, information recalled explicitly and related information receives some activation, and the activation of this information may facilitate subsequent encoding during the misinformation learning phase (i.e., a form of long-term semantic priming that is augmented by strategic, controlled processes, Balota, Black, & Cheney, 1992; Becker, Moscovitch, Behrmann, & Joordens, 1997; Chan et al., 2006) . Note that none of the discussed accounts are mutually exclusive and that a constellation of factors could be contributing to RES.
Conclusions
Our findings show that initial recall can increase subsequent eyewitness suggestibility regardless of the recall test format. Contrary to the idea that RES is contingent on an initial cued recall test that draws attention to the later misinformation, the present results indicate that the RES effect might be more pervasive than previously thought. Overall, the effect has been found in free recall, cued recall, recognition Thomas et al., 2010) , and source discrimination (Chan et al., 2012) ; it occurs at delays of 30 min, 48 hr, and a week between the witnessed event and final test (regardless of whether the misinformation occurs before or after the delay, Chan & Langley, 2011; Chan & LaPaglia, 2011) , and it is found in both between-and within-subjects comparisons (Chan & LaPaglia, 2011) .
Although RES appears to be robust, it is, fortunately, not universal. First, initial testing can enhance subsequent eyewitness memory performance in the absence of misinformation. et al., 2010) . It would be fruitful for future research to attempt to pinpoint when repeated retrieval can exacerbate and when it can inoculate against eyewitness suggestibility . Granted, providing answers to such questions will require a series of systematic and careful investigations. However, given the prevalence and frequency that eyewitnesses are asked to retrieve information in the process of a criminal investigation, a more thorough understanding of the effects of retrieval on suggestibility would be instrumental to devising techniques and policies to enhance the accuracy of eyewitness evidence.
The present research primarily serves to demonstrate the generality of RES. The extension of RES to protocols using free recall poses important implications for legal contexts.
RES also adds an interesting dimension to the literature on test-potentiated learning or the interim test effect by demonstrating that the improvements in long-term recall might extend to both true and false information. Broadly speaking, at its core, RES contributes to a long line of research that continues to further our understanding of retrieval processes in human memory (Schacter, Eich, & Tulving, 1978) . (Masson & Loftus, 2003 18. As the burglar escaped from the museum in the video, the guards began to shoot at him, how many guards were shooting at the burglar as he got away?
[Correct Answer : 3] 
